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Recent studies have shown that acute stress can lead to riskier decision making. Yet,
the underlying mechanisms of the stress effects on decisions under risk remain poorly
understood. To gain a better understanding of decision-making processes and potential
strategy application under stress, we investigated decision making in pure gain and
loss domains with unequal expected values (EVs) across alternatives. We conducted an
experimental study with a 2 × 2 design (stress vs. no stress and gain domain vs. loss
domain). The Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) was utilized to induce acute stress. Controls
performed the placebo-TSST (p-TSST). To validate the stress response we measured
salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase concentrations. We used a modified version of the
Game of Dice Task (GDT) to assess decision-making performance in a gain and a loss
domain. Results showed that non-stressed participants made less risky decisions in the
gain domain compared to those of the loss domain. This behavior is in accordance with
previous studies and indicates the stability of the framing effect in even more complex
tasks with changing EVs across alternatives. Stress did not alter risk taking behavior in
the gain domain. Yet, in the loss domain stressed participants made less risky decisions
compared to controls. Additionally, the data support earlier findings of longer reaction
times in loss compared to gain domains due to higher cognitive effort for loss-framed
decisions. It is discussed that stress may lead to reduced amygdala activation, which has
been found to reduce riskier decisions in a loss domain. With respect to earlier results of
riskier decisions in tasks that unite both gain and loss domains, it is discussed whether
stress leads to a stronger evaluation of high gains and a neglect of losses.
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INTRODUCTION
Decisions under risk are frequently made in a context of explicit
and stable rules with foreseeable consequences of the specific
alternatives (Brand et al., 2006). One way to experimentally mea-
sure performance of decisions under risk is the Game of Dice
Task (GDT), a computerized game of chance (Brand et al., 2005).
Riskier, i.e., poorer decisions in the GDT have been associ-
ated with lower executive functioning (Brand et al., 2007, 2009;
Schiebener et al., 2011) and dysfunctions of the dopaminergic sys-
tem as shown in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Brand et al.,
2004; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Labudda et al., 2010). Interestingly,
in a series of studies we also observed riskier decision making
after the induction of acute psychosocial stress and its associ-
ated increase in cortisol concentrations (Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst
et al., 2013a,b). As the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is associated with
executive functioning and feedback processing (Bechara et al.,
2000; Fuster, 2000), both essential for advantageous decision
making in conditions under risk (Manes et al., 2002; Brand et al.,
2006), we interpreted riskier decision making as evidence for the
negative effects of the stress hormone cortisol on PFC-mediated
control functions. Support of our posit is found in stress-altered
PFC activity (Pruessner et al., 2008, 2010; Dedovic et al., 2009b)
and the influence of stress on dopamine efflux in the PFC (Butts
et al., 2011).
In all trials of the original version of the GDT a die is thrown
and participants are to guess what number will be shown. If par-
ticipants are right money is won. Otherwise money is lost (Brand
et al., 2005). Thus, in the original GDT participants are con-
fronted with potential gains and losses. Research on the framing
effect conducted within the framework of dual-process theories
(Epstein et al., 1996; Kahneman, 2003) has revealed differences
between decision making in gain and loss domains. Typically, in
the gain domain risk avoidant behavior is shown by choosing a
high winning probability associated with smaller gains. Contrary,
in the loss domain risk seeking has been observed, manifested
by choosing alternatives with a low loss frequency, but associ-
ated with high losses. Alternatives with more certain, yet lower
losses are less likely to be chosen (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
Such behavior has been found even when the economical out-
come, known as expected value (EV; product of the probability-
weighted value of a specific alternative), was worse for the more
advantageous probabilities (high winning, low losing) compared
to alternatives with the less advantageous probabilities (low win-
ning, high losing; Aite et al., 2012; Koop and Johnson, 2012). This
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phenomenon has been interpreted as evoked by an emotional
response bias reflecting a strong desire for gains and a strong
aversion for losses (Camerer, 2005; Druckman and McDermott,
2008; Rick, 2011). Previous research has illustrated that the fram-
ing effect is susceptible to current emotional states of the decision
maker (Williams et al., 2003; Cassotti et al., 2012). In addition, a
first stress study has reported that stress, induced by the cold pres-
sor test, leads to an enhancement of framing in both, gain and loss
domains (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009).
As the GDT is a rather complex decision-making task, in
the current study the attempt was to gain a better understand-
ing of strategy use under stress in mere gain and loss domains.
Hence, we modified the GDT presenting either a mere gain or
loss domain. Further, we adjusted the monetary amounts of gains
and losses to ensure equal increases of EVs with increasing win-
ning and losing probabilities in each domain. Therefore, the least
risky alternatives were most economical, also. As framed deci-
sions are influenced by emotional biases (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981, 1986; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007) and EVs do not seem
to be considered (Aite et al., 2012; Koop and Johnson, 2012),
for non-stressed participants we expect no effect of altered EVs.
Thus, among controls we expected the typical framing effect of
less risky decisions in the gain and more risky decisions in the
loss domain. Based on the results of Porcelli and Delgado (2009)
stress should lead to an enhanced framing effect, with even less
risky behavior in gain and riskier behavior in loss domains. Yet,
pharmacological studies illustrate that high cortisol concentra-
tions can lead to risky decision making, if the potential reward
is high (Putman et al., 2010). Also, patients with amygdala lesions
showed decreased framing effects in the loss domain (de Martino
et al., 2010). Stress is thought to alter amygdala activity with
a potential decrease (Pruessner et al., 2008; Merz et al., 2010)
and may thus lead to a diminished framing effect in the loss
domain. As the methodology of Porcelli and Delgado (2009) dif-
fers from ours (time of decision-making performance right after
stress induction at a time where no cortisol increase is to be
expected), we hypothesized that stress would lead to a diminished
framing effect, which might be especially pronounced in the loss
domain, i.e., less risky decisions in the loss domain.
An additional goal was to replicate earlier findings of longer
reaction times in loss domains due to a higher cost-benefit trade-
off associated with higher cognitive effort in loss compared to gain
domains (Gonzalez et al., 2005). Previous research by our group
indicates that stress may not affect speed of GDT performance in
the original version (Pabst et al., 2013b).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighty (40 female) healthy students were recruited, aged 18–35
years, M = 24.29, SD = 3.54. They were randomly assigned
to the four experimental groups: no stress—gain domain,
no stress—loss domain, stress—gain domain, and stress—loss
domain. We conducted a standardized telephone interview prior
to the testing appointments, to ensure participants met the
following requirements: no history of neurological or psychi-
atric disease, no smoking or drug abuse, no obesity (Body
Mass Index [BMI in kg/m2] > 30), and no shift work. Also,
anyone familiar with the stressor and the decision-making task
was excluded. Women were not tested during menses and did
not use hormonal contraceptives of any kind (Kirschbaum
et al., 1999). Testing was conducted between 10:00 a.m. and
12:00. Participants were asked not to exercise and to abstain
from alcohol 24 h and to get up 2 h before testing. Further,
they were instructed not to eat and to merely drink water
1 h before testing. Written informed consent was given and
C12 were received for participation. The Ethic committee of
the German Psychological Association (DGPs) approved the
study.
STRESS INDUCTION
We used the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al.,
1993) for induction of acute stress. The TSST is an effective
method to reliably activate the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004), causing elevated
cortisol concentrations. It also increases the activity of the sym-
pathetic nervous system (SNS), as illustrated by increases in the
enzyme alpha-amylase (Nater and Rohleder, 2009; Rohleder and
Nater, 2009). Standing in front of a reserved and distant acting
committee of two individuals (a man and a woman), participants
had to perform two consecutive tasks. After a preparation time,
a free speech had to be given, followed by a mental arithmetic
(5min each; total length of 15min). In addition, participants were
told that they were video-taped and that the video material would
be used for further analyses after the task. Participants of the
control group performed the placebo-TSST (p-TSST; Het et al.,
2009), a non-stressful situation following the pattern of the TSST,
but lacking all the socio-evaluative components. Participants were
alone in the room giving a speech and performed a simplified
arithmetical task.
MEASUREMENT OF AFFECT
We administered the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) to assess positive and negative affect
right before and after stress induction. Participants were to state
how they felt at the very moment, answering 10 items for negative
and positive affect, respectively, on a scale from 1 (very slightly or
not at all) to 5 (extremely). We computed two scores using the
total of either all positive or all negative items. A higher score
indicated higher positive or negative affect, respectively.
ASSESSMENT OF BIOLOGICAL STRESS MARKERS
Salivary samples were collected by using salivette collection
devices (Sarstedt, Nuembrecht, Germany) to assess alterations
in endocrine activity at four points in time (1min before and
1, 10, and 20min after the TSST or p-TSST). Salivary corti-
sol concentrations served as an indicator of HPA axis activity
(Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004). As an indirect marker of nora-
drenergic activity, we assessed salivary alpha-amylase (sAA; Nater
and Rohleder, 2009; Rohleder and Nater, 2009). Samples were
analyzed at the Laboratory of Professor Kirschbaum, Department
of Biopsychology, Technical University Dresden, Germany. For
free cortisol analysis a commercially available immunoassay was
used (IBL, Hamburg, Germany). A quantitative enzyme-kinetic
method was used for sAA analysis, as described somewhere else
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(Rohleder and Nater, 2009). Inter- and intra-assay variations were
below 12%.
DECISION-MAKING PERFORMANCE
To assess decision making in a gain and a loss domain, we mod-
ified the original GDT (Brand et al., 2005) with the result of a
pure gain and a pure loss domain and the independent variable
of domain as a between subject factor. The GDT is a comput-
erized game of chance simulating decision making under risk.
The goal in the gain and loss domains is to respectively maximize
gains or minimize losses. Participants of the gain domain started
with a capital of C0 and of the loss domain with C1000. In both
domains, a single die is thrown in each of 18 trials. Beforehand,
participants must choose from given and always present alter-
natives, consisting of a single number or a combination of two,
three, or four numbers and thereby guess what number might be
thrown. In the gain domain money is won, if the thrown number
matches a single number or a number among the chosen combi-
nation. Else, nomoney is won. In the loss domainmoney is lost, if
the thrown number does not match a number among the chosen
alternative. Else, money will not be lost. Thus, in both conditions
a match of numbers was perceived as positive. Feedback is given
about the outcome and the current capital, after each trial.
With every combination a specific gain or loss is associated and
a winning/not winning or losing/not losing probability. We clas-
sified the alternatives into more advantageous, i.e., less risky, and
more disadvantageous, i.e., more risky, by the EV (i.e., the mone-
tary gain/loss times the associated probability); a higher EV being
more advantageous. For both domains higher winning/losing
probabilities were associated with higher EVs. The amounts of the
original GDT were adopted accordingly. In the gain domain, by
choosing a single number C600 may be gained (winning prob-
ability 1 out of 6; EV C100). A combination of two numbers is
associated with C400 (winning probability 2 out of 6; EV C133),
a combination of three numbers may gain C333 (winning prob-
ability 3 out of 6; EV C166), and a four-number combination is
associated with a C300 gain (winning probability 4 out of 6; EV
C200). In the loss domain, by choosing a single number C120
may be lost (losing probability 5 out of 6; EV C −100). With
a two-number combination C200 may be lost (losing probabil-
ity 4 out of 6; EV C −133). A combination of three numbers
may lose C333 (losing probability 3 out of 6; EV C −166), and a
combination of four numbers is associated with a C600 loss (los-
ing probability 2 out of 6; EV C −200). We refer to Figure 1 for
graphical illustration.
Trial sequences of the GDT were: first, choosing one out of
altogether 14 alternatives, as grouped into the mentioned four
categories; second, the die is thrown; and third, feedback is given
about any gain or loss, the current capital and the number of
trials left. For performance measurement we computed a net
score by subtraction of the more disadvantageous alternatives
from the more advantageous alternatives. According to the ear-
lier computed EV in the gain domain the more advantageous
alternatives consisted of the three and four number combinations
and the more disadvantageous alternatives of the single num-
bers and two number combinations. In the loss domain the more
advantageous alternatives consisted of the single numbers and
FIGURE 1 | A modified version of the Game of Dice Task, to measure
decision making in situations of risk in a gain (above) or a loss (below)
domain. Participants follow the goal to maximize gains or to minimize
losses, respectively. In the gain domain risk is defined by lower winning
probabilities, higher gains, and concomitant lower expected values (single
numbers and two number combinations). In the loss domain risk is defined
by lower losing probabilities, higher losses, and lower expected values
(three and four number combinations). Performance is measured by a net
score computed by subtraction of the two more risky alternatives form the
two less risky alternatives. For a detailed description of the task we refer to
the method section (decision-making performance). Winning/losing
probabilities and expected values were not displayed during task
performance (information not provided for performance is highlighted by
dashed lines).
two number combinations and the more disadvantageous alter-
natives of the three and four number combinations. A higher net
score indicated more advantageous decision making.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
First, participants answered a demographic questionnaire fol-
lowed by the PANAS and the first salivary sample at baseline right
before the TSST or p-TSST, respectively. After the TSST or p-
TSST the PANAS was administered again and the second salivary
sample was taken. At approximately cortisol peak, 10min after
the TSST or p-TSST, the third salivary sample was taken and the
GDT gain or the GDT loss was performed. Thus, participants
were equally assigned to the four experimental groups of control
gain, control loss, stress gain, or stress loss. Participants collected
a fourth salivary sample after task completion, about 20min after
the TSST or p-TSST.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We used SPSS 20.0 to conduct all statistical analyses. Groups
were compared for age and BMI using a One-Way analysis
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of variance (ANOVA). Group differences for sex were ana-
lyzed using Pearson’s χ2 test. Cortisol and sAA alterations and
changes in positive and negative affect were detected by using an
ANOVA with repeated measurement. We conducted a t-test for
independent samples for sAA increase comparisons. A multivari-
ate ANOVA was computed for decision-making performance and
reaction time in the domains. For group comparisons concern-
ing cortisol and sAA concentrations at different points in time
of measurement and as follow up tests of group differences in
decision-making performance and reaction time, simple effects
tests were conducted. Two-tailed tests were performed with p set
to 0.05 for all analyses.
RESULTS
Conducting a One-WayANOVAwe found no differences between
the four groups for age (in years) or BMI (in kg/m²). Also,
males and females were equally distributed between groups.
Demographic values can be found in Table 1.
CORTISOL AND sAA
We conducted a 2 (stress) × 2 (sex) × 4 (measurement time-
points) repeated measurement ANOVA for cortisol and sAA to
determine stress effects between stress and control groups. Results
indicated an increase in cortisol for the stress group, but non for
controls. Further, we found a sex difference with women show-
ing overall lower cortisol concentrations. For cortisol significant
main effects for stress, F(1, 75) = 18.91, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20, sex,
F(1, 75) = 7.72, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.09, and time, F(1.50, 112.50) =
14.42, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.16, were found, as well as a significant
interaction of Time × Stress, F(1.50, 112.50) = 49.49, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.40. Follow up analyses with simple effects tests showed
that stress and control group differed in sampling points 1, 10,
and 20min after stress cessation, all F(1, 77) > 9.67, all p < 0.003,
all η2 > 0.11. Males and females of the stress group differed
in sampling points 1min before and 1min after the TSST, all
F(1, 38) > 6.31, all p < 0.016, all η2 > 0.14, and females showed
a trend of lower cortisol in sampling points 10 and 20min after
stress cessation, all F(1, 38) > 3.76, all p < 0.06, all η2 > 0.09.
Results are illustrated in Figure 2.
We found no increase of sAA concentration in controls and an
increase in sAA in the stress group. We found no main effect for
stress or sex, but a significant main effect for time, F(2.32, 171.96) =
19.57, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21, as well as a significant interaction
of Time × Stress, F(2.32, 171.96) = 14.37, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.16.
Follow up simple effects tests showed a significant difference
for baseline measurement, controls showing a higher sAA base-
line, F(1, 76) = 5.68, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.07. We also found a trend
of an increase in the stress group 1min after stress cessation,
F(1, 76) = 3.24, p = 0.076, η2 = 0.04. T-tests for independent
samples showed a sAA increase (1min after cessation of stress
induction minus baseline) for the stress group, but not for con-
trols, t(69.11) = −5.65, p < 0.001. Results did not show any sig-
nificant interactions with the factor sex. Results are illustrated in
Figure 3.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT
We did not find any differences between groups or alterations over
time for positive affect. Results showed an increase in negative
affect for the stress group, but not controls. Sex differences were
not found. We conducted a 2 (stress) × 2 (sex)× 2 (measurement
FIGURE 2 | Results of the salivary cortisol measures of the stress
group (stress) compared to the control group (control) during the
course of the experiment. Stress increased cortisol within the stress
group. Stressed males showed an overall higher cortisol concentration
compared to females. Data represent means and standard errors.
Table 1 | Demographic variables of the four experimental groups (each group N = 20).
Control gain Control loss Stress gain Stress loss F χ2 df p
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Age 24.60 (3.84) 24.65 (2.96) 23.10 (4.40) 24.80 (2.71) 1.010 3, 79 0.393
Sex 20 (f = 10) 20 (f = 10) 20 (f = 10) 20 (f = 10) 0.000 3, 80 1.00
BMI 22.82 (2.36) 22.11 (2.00) 22.06 (2.79) 22.10 (2.46) 0.452 3, 79 0.717
We found no group differences for age (in years), sex, or Body Mass Index (BMI, in kg/m2 ).
Control Gain, Control group gain domain; Control Loss, Control group loss domain; Stress Gain, Stress group gain domain; Stress Loss, Stress group loss domain;
f, female.
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FIGURE 3 | Results of the salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) measures of
stress group (stress) and control group (control) during the course of
the experiment. Stress increased sAA concentrations in the stress group,
but not in controls. Data represent means and standard errors.
Table 2 | Results of the positive affect and negative affect schedule.
Control M (SD) Stress M (SD)
PANAS-PAbase 29.43 (6.78) 30.75 (6.29)
PANAS-PAafter 30.25 (7.90) 30.15 (7.72)
PANAS-NAbase 11.68 (2.06) 12.95 (5.26)
PANAS-NAafter 12.08 (2.99) 18.55 (7.39)
Changes in positive and negative affect in the stress and control group are
indicated.
Positive affect did not change over time and differences between the stress
group (Stress) and the control group (Control) were not found. Negative affect
increased over time in the stress group. Controls did not show altered negative
affect (see results section). PANAS, Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule;
PA, positive affect; NA, negative affect; base, baseline measurement; after,
measurement after stress cessation or resting, respectively.
time-points) ANOVA with repeated measurement for positive
and negative affect, respectively. Results showed no significant
main effect for group or time or any interactions with the fac-
tor stress for positive affect. For negative affect a significant main
effect for time, F(1, 76) = 32.10, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.30, and also
a significant interaction of Time × Stress, F(1, 76) = 24.11, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.24, could be shown. Descriptive statistics can be
found in Table 2.
DECISION-MAKING PERFORMANCE
We performed a multivariate ANOVA with GDT net score
and reaction time as the dependent variables and with stress,
domain, and sex as between subject factors. For GDT net
score, results showed a trend for a main effect for stress,
F(1, 72) = 2.83, p = 0.097, η2 = 0.04, and a significant main
FIGURE 4 | Game of Dice Task (GDT) performance represented by the
mean net score (number of less risky choices minus number of more
risky choices). Statistical analysis using an ANOVA revealed that among
non-stressed participants riskier decisions were made in the loss domain.
The same pattern was shown for stressed participants. Yet, for the loss
domain, stressed participants showed less risky decision making compared
to controls. We found no differences for controls and stressed participants
of the gain domain. Data represent means over participants with standard
errors. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
effect for domain, F(1, 72) = 19.42, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21. We
found no sex effect and none of the interactions of the three
factors reached significance. Follow up analyses with simple
effects tests showed significant riskier behavior for non-stressed
participants within the loss compared to the gain domain,
F(1, 76) = 16.79, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.18. No difference was found
in the gain domain between stressed and control participants,
F(1, 76) = 0.09, p = 0.759, η2 < 0.01. Most interestingly, in the
loss domain we found a significant difference between controls
and stressed participants, F(1, 76) = 4.52, p = 0.037, η2 = 0.06,
stressed participants making less risky decisions compared to
controls. Results are illustrated in Figure 4.
For reaction time, we found a significant main effect for
domain, F(1, 72) = 6.55, p = 0.013, η2 = 0.08, and no effects for
stress, sex, or any of their interactions. As illustrated in Figure 5,
results indicated longer reaction times for participants of the loss
domain.
We analyzed the relationship between decision-making perfor-
mance and cortisol concentration. Results were non-significant
for linear, as well as for non-linear relationships.
DISCUSSION
In this study we investigated the effects of acute stress on fram-
ing with unequal distributed EVs across alternatives. After stress
induction we found a rapid increase in SNS activity as indicated
by sAA and the typical slower increase in cortisol concentrations
indicating higher HPA axis activity in the stress group. The stress
effect is supported by an increase in negative affect in the stress
group after stress cessation.
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FIGURE 5 | Reaction time (in milliseconds) for gain and loss domain as
measured by a modified version of the Game of Dice Task. An ANOVA
showed a main effect for domain with longer reaction times in the loss
domains. Stress did not exert an effect on reaction time. Data represent
means over participants with standard errors.
Among non-stressed participants we found higher risk-taking
in the loss compared to the gain domain despite better EVs asso-
ciated with lower risk alternatives. This behavior is in accordance
with studies investigating framed decision making [for a review
see Rick (2011)] and may be explained by an urge to avoid
losses by all means (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Frederick,
2007). As such, these decisions are emotionally driven (Bechara
and Damasio, 2005) and the applied decision-making strategy
may have been the focus on lower losing probabilities only,
instead of a calculative approach. This postulation is in line with
results indicating participant’s preference for alternatives with a
low loss frequency (Lin et al., 2009; Aite et al., 2012; Koop and
Johnson, 2012), thus choosing the better probability over the bet-
ter economical outcome. Our results show no effect of higher
EVs associated with less risky alternatives, as the framing effect
remains stable and participants in the loss domain continue to
make risky decisions. Consequently, our findings support the pos-
tulate that an emotional system is involved in framed decisions as
suggested by dual-process theories (Druckman and McDermott,
2008; Cassotti et al., 2012) and are robust even after manipulation
of the EV.
By modifying the GDTwe could show that the framing effect is
also present in more complex decision-making tasks. So far, most
studies investigating framing effects in a monetary setting used
simple lottery tasks (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Kuhberger,
1998; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009). Performing such a task, in
a single trial participants are confronted with two alternatives
only, each trial being self-contained. On the other hand, the GDT
allows planning and strategizing by constantly choosing one out
of altogether 14 always-present alternatives for a total of 18 tri-
als. Thus, the stability of the emotional-driven framing effect
seems also to suppress rationality in a task that is associated with
higher cognitive functioning (Schiebener et al., 2011; Pabst et al.,
2013b).
An additional finding is the increased response time in the
loss compared to the gain domain. This may be due to a cost-
benefit tradeoff associated with higher cognitive load in the loss
compared to the gain domain (Gonzalez et al., 2005) and can be
observed in the GDT as well.
Our central finding is the stress-reduced effect of loss fram-
ing, as we found less risky behavior of stressed compared to
non-stressed participants. In the gain domain similar behavior
of the stress and control group was shown. Earlier results of our
groups indicate stress effects of riskier decision making in the
original GDT that combines gains and losses (Starcke et al., 2008;
Pabst et al., 2013a,b). The question is raised how these results
may relate to one another and how the current results help to
understand our earlier findings. First, we will discuss the stress
effects on loss and gain domains followed by an integration of the
results.
An explanation may be found in the influence of stress on
the amygdala and the role of the amygdala in the framing
effect. A patient study reported an elimination of loss aver-
sion and less risky decisions in a loss domain in patients with
amygdala lesions (de Martino et al., 2010). A PET study has
shown that stress may lead to a decrease in amygdala activ-
ity (Pruessner et al., 2008) even though findings are some-
what compromised by the relatively poor spatial resolution of
this imaging technique. Also, decreased amygdala activity has
been found after cortisol administration in two fMRI fear con-
ditioning studies (Merz et al., 2010, 2012). Moreover, studies
reported that cortisol induced a loss of specificity in amygdala
responding as well as a functional decoupling of the amyg-
dala with the PFC (Henckens et al., 2010, 2012). We therefore
hypothesize that stress may have decreased loss aversion due to
altered amygdala activity. This could result in a diminished fram-
ing effect in loss domains (reduced fear of losing) after acute
stress exposure. Clearly imaging studies investigating the rela-
tionship between stress, loss aversion, and amygdala activity are
needed.
Moreover, studies show that other brain regions may also
be involved in decisions in loss domains, specifically loss aver-
sion, such as the striatum, the ventromedial PFC, the ventral
anterior cingulate cortex, and the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(Tom et al., 2007). Results indicate a relationship between activity
decrease of these regions and increases in potential losses. Stress
induced alterations of activity in these brain regions (Dedovic
et al., 2009a) may be another potential explanation for less risky
decision making in a loss domain.
Further, stress evokes a combination of negative emotions
(Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004). Our results support this pos-
tulation, as there was an increase in negative affect after the
TSST. Although findings on negative emotion and decision mak-
ing have been somewhat inconsistent (Raghunathan and Pham,
1999; Lerner and Keltner, 2000), risk avoidance has been shown
after induction of negative affective states (Yuen and Lee, 2003).
In such a state participants may stronger evaluate higher losses
and therefore tend to choose alternatives associated with lower
losses, despite the higher loss frequency.
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Another emotion-based explanation is the idea that negative
emotions can be supportive of systematic processing (Schwarz,
1990) and are not necessarily a threat to rationality (Pfister and
Bohm, 2008). Further support of this hypothesis is found in
research indicating that individuals with a high ability of emotion
regulation show reduced loss aversion due to a shift from an emo-
tional to a rather cognitive strategy (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009).
Also, risk seeking behavior seems to stem from an overestimation
of the emotional impact of a potential loss. Kermer et al. (2006)
found that the actual emotional impact of a loss was smaller than
the anticipated impact. If stress led to a rather cognitive strat-
egy, stress may have decreased the effect of overestimating the
emotional impact. Thus, it may be possible that participants actu-
ally applied a calculative strategy by making decisions based on a
better EV.
In the literature it is postulated that high cortisol concen-
trations evoke a shift from higher to lower cognitive strategies
(Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; Putman et al., 2010; Ossewaarde
et al., 2011), such as from a goal-directed to a habitual strat-
egy (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009; Schwabe et al., 2010a,b, 2011).
May such a shift explain the less risky behavior of stressed par-
ticipants in the loss domain? Two approaches may be applied.
First, for non-stressed participants it is postulated that riskier
decision making in a loss domain originates from an emotional
approach, which is to avoid losses (Kahneman, 2003; Cassotti
et al., 2012). It has been postulated that stress enforces habitual
behavior and thus riskier behavior may be expected, as this would
be the initial behavior [see Porcelli and Delgado (2009)]. The sec-
ond approach is the potential advantage of bounded rationality
and the use of heuristics. A rather large number of studies suggests
that not higher cognitive processes, but intuitive and habitual
responses may lead to better decision making (Gigerenzer, 2004;
Brandstatter et al., 2006; Marewski et al., 2010). Instead of a cal-
culative approach stressed participants of the loss domain may
have laid focus on the monetary values, only. Thus, we believe
that altered decision making may be explained by a strategy shift
from higher to lower cognition. Yet, the underlying mechanisms
need more investigation.
In the gain domain stress did not lead to riskier decision
making as hypothesized. As decision making differs within gain
and loss domains (Kahneman, 2003), we believe that a poten-
tial stress-induced reduction of amygdala activity (Pruessner
et al., 2008; Merz et al., 2010) may not alter decision making in
gain domains. This posit is supported by a positive relationship
between amygdala inactivation and a reduction of preferences for
larger, more costly rewards (Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009).
Our study does not replicate the enhanced framing effect
found by Porcelli and Delgado (2009), which may have two main
reasons. First, the points in time of task performance were not
similar. Porcelli and Delgado (2009) performed the decision-
making task right after stress induction (which lasted only a
few minutes). At their time of testing SNS activity, but most
likely no cortisol increase occurred (Dickerson andKemeny, 2004;
Schwabe et al., 2008). In contrast we investigated the impact of
stress-induced cortisol effects. Unfortunately, a comparison of
cortisol concentrations during the decision tasks is not possi-
ble as Porcelli and Delgado (2009) measured skin conductance
response, only. Decision making may depend on the temporal
relation of task performance to the stressor and may evoke dif-
ferent behavior (Koot et al., 2013; Pabst et al., 2013a; Vinkers
et al., 2013). Thus, Porcelli and Delgado (2009) may have found
the enhanced framing effect under conditions of stress induced
emotional arousal. Our findings in contrast may rather reflect
the impact of stress induced cortisol elevations on decision mak-
ing. Future pharmacological studies could address this issue more
directly. Second, the simple lottery task and the more complex
GDT are difficult to compare, as has already been discussed above.
Also, we manipulated the EV, which could have led participants
to apply a calculative strategy. Not so for Porcelli and Delgado
(2009), where EVs did not differ.
How do the current results relate to the stress effects of riskier
decisions in the more complex original GDT? The original GDT
combines both gains and losses (Brand et al., 2005). Thus, riskier
behavior is defined by choosing alternatives associated with possi-
ble high gains and low winning probabilities, but also high losing
probabilities and an equivalent high loss. Our results in the stress
loss domain show a decrease of risky decision making, as it may
be evoked by a stress-induced reduction of amygdala activity (de
Martino et al., 2010). Thus, we may hypothesize that under acute
stress the focus in the original GDT is laid on gains rather than
on losses or probabilities. This is in accordance with previous
findings of striving for the big reward after cortisol administra-
tion even if it means to take a higher risk (Putman et al., 2010).
If stress resulted in striving for the high reward, we should have
found riskier decision making in the stress gain domain. Reasons
for this missing stress effect have been discussed above.
We did not find any relationship between decision-making
performance and cortisol concentration, similar to former stud-
ies of our groups (Pabst et al., 2013a,b). We believe that this
might reflect indirect cortisol effects mediated by dopamine. As
the release of dopamine seems to depend on the extent of cor-
tisol secretion (Butts et al., 2011; Nagano-Saito et al., 2013),
higher dopaminemay have an impact on behavior (Floresco et al.,
2008; Assadi et al., 2009; Mather and Lighthall, 2012). Further,
studies have shown a high interindividual variance of GDT per-
formance in stressed participants (Starcke et al., 2008), as well as
in glucocorticoid sensitivity (Hellhammer et al., 2009; Kudielka
et al., 2009), which may also account for a missing direct rela-
tionship. On a further note it should be mentioned that we did
not take salivary samples beyond the time point 20min after
stress cessation and therefore are not able to provide informa-
tion about negative feedback of the HPA axis. Future studies
would benefit from the assessment of cortisol over a longer time
span.
We did not observe any sex differences. Studies show that stress
may lead to different behavior, as males may make more risky
decisions and women may make less risky decisions (Lighthall
et al., 2009, 2012). Also, men show slower learning of task con-
tingencies with increasing cortisol. Performance of women seems
to follow an inverted U-shaped function (van den Bos et al.,
2009). Other results indicate poorer performance of both sexes
at the beginning of task performance with woman showing an
improvement later in the game, while men show continuously
poor performance (Preston et al., 2007). Yet, for the GDT we
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observe neither sex differences nor sex by stress interactions
(Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst et al., 2013b). Thus, the occurrence
of sex differences might depend on the specific paradigms
used.
In summary our results show the typical framing effect among
non-stressed participants of riskier decision making in the loss
compared to the gain domain. Stress did not amplify the fram-
ing effect but instead reduced the amount of risky decisions taken
in the loss domain. Thus, the combination of loss expectancies
and stress interacted in a way which reduced risk-taking behavior.
Underlying psychological and neurobiological mechanisms are in
need of further explorations.
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